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Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court on June 21,1996, wherein
the trial court denied Defendant's ("George") Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and sentenced
him to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
L

Did George involuntarily and unknowingly enter his guilty plea based on the

conduct of his trial counsel, Solomon Chacon, which was insufficient so as to deny George his
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel? Because this matter was remanded to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B, this is a mixed question of law
and fact. In Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993), the supreme court stated that

"deference is given to findings of fact, which will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
ultimate conclusions of law are to be reviewed for correctness." See also State v. Hay. 859 P.2d
1,4-5 (Utah 1993) (holding that a claim of ineffectiveness presents mixed question of law and
fact in which the appellate court will afford the trial court's conclusions no deference but
findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous).
2.

Did the prosecutor breach the plea agreement when he promised to recommend

to the court that George receive no prison time and then recommend to the Office of Adult
Probation and Parole that George was a candidate for prison if he did not admit sexual intent?
Breach of plea agreements are usually reviewed under principles of contract law and with the
additional burden of constitutional protections being added and thus should be reviewed as issues
of law and reviewed de novo or for correctness with no difference to the trial court's
determinations. See United States v. Van Thournout. 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Proceedings,

1.

This case is before this Court as a result of the trial court's denial of George's

Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea and the trial court's subsequent judgment sentencing George
to prison forthwith for 0-5 years. R. at 85-106.
2.

George is challenging the trial court's decision to deny his Motion to Withdraw

his Guilty Plea and the ensuing judgment. George bases his appeal claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and breach of the plea agreement by the prosecutor.
2

B.

The Course of the Proceedings in the Lower Court.

1.

In June, 1995, George was charged by Information with Aggravated Sexual Abuse

of a Child, a First Degree Felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1995). R. at 9-10.
2.

On February 16, 1996, the George entered a not guilty plea in his Arraignment

before Judge J. Dennis Frederick. R. at 17-18.
3.

On March 29, 1996, Judge Frederick ordered the Trial continued to May 7, 1996.

R. at 23.
4.

On May 6, 1996, George entered a change of plea to the Third Degree Felony of

Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child. R. at 24-33.
5.

On June 5, 1996, present counsel, Gregory G. Skordas, entered his Substitution

of Counsel for Defendant. R. at 35-36. On that same day. Defendant filed a Motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. R. at 37-38.
6.

On June 21,1996, Defendant argued his Motion to withdraw his guilty plea which

the court denied and sentenced the George to serve a 0-5 year prison term at the Utah State
Prison to be served forthwith. R. at 42-45.
7.

On July 3, 1996, Defendant filed a Motion for Amendment of the Judgment. R.

at 47-48. The court denied Defendant's Motion for Modification of the Sentence by way of
Minute Entry on September 5, 1996. R. at 66-67.
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8.

On July 19, 1996, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal. R. at 59-60.

9.

On October 31,1996, Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum with the Court

of Appeals requesting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B.
10.

On December 4,1996, Defendant and the State filed a Stipulation and Motion to

Remand for a Rule 23B Evidentiary hearing.
11.

On January 2,1997, the Court of Appeals ordered the matter remanded to the trial

court for an Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B concerning trial counsel's
representations to Defendant regarding the plea agreement. R. at 107.
12.

On March 17,1997, the Third District Court held an Evidentiary Hearing to make

findings of fact concerning the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Third District Court's
findings were issued on April 30, 1997. R. at 113-22.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In June of 1995, George was charged by Information with Aggravated Sexual Abuse of
a Child, a First Degree Felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1995).
Following an interview with the Murray Police, George, who had never been involved
with the legal system in any way retained Solomon Chacon to represent him and "help him out
of the mess he perceived himself to be in." R. at 149-50, 131. George had several interviews
with his attorney wherein he repeatedly told Mr. Chacon that although he had touched the victim,
he had no intent to sexually gratify himself. R. at 132-34, 152.
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In January, 1996, George underwent a psychosexual treatment evaluation performed by
Dr. Larry H. Fox at the request of Mr. Chacon. R. at 134. Throughout the evaluation process,
George vehemently maintained his innocence of the crime charged. R. at 136.
Dr. Fox's psychosexual evaluation report indicated that George would be at best, a very
difficult candidate for sexual treatment even if he had committed a sex crime. R. at 138. Despite
this knowledge, Mr. Chacon and the Assistant District Attorney, James M. Cope, entered into
plea negotiations with the intent to obtain for George a sentence of probation and therapy. R.
at 138, 173. Mr. Chacon assured George that if he pleaded guilty to a Third Degree Felony
conviction for Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child, that George would not have to declare that
he had any intent to receive sexual gratification by the touching. R. at 139-40, 173-74. Mr.
Chacon further guaranteed George that his sentence would include probation with out-patient
counseling, thus avoiding a prison sentence. R. at 173. Relying upon Mr. Chacon's assurances
and promptings, George entered a guilty plea on May 6, 1996. R. at 24-33, 173-74.
In addition, the prosecutor promised, in the plea agreement, to recommend probation for
George rather than prison. R. at 26-33. Despite this promise to George on June 7, 1996, the
prosecutor informed the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that George should not be given
probation if he did not admit to sexual intent. See Presentence Investigative Report at p. 13,
attached hereto as Addendum "D".
On May 6,1996, George signed the plea agreement and the trial court accepted George's
change of plea. R. at 73-84. After his interview with Karen Shepherd of the Office of Adult
5

Probation and Parole, George realized that to obtain a recommendation for probation and
therapy, he was required to declare himself a sexual predator to Ms. Shepherd despite the
assurances that he would no have to admit sexual problems. He then hired new counsel with the
intent to withdraw his guilty plea because he adamantly denied that any touching occurred with
sexual intent. R. at 174.
George filed a Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. R. at 37-38. On June 21, 1997, the
trial court heard arguments on the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea, denied the Motion and
sentenced George to prison for 0-5 years to be served forthwith. R. at 85-106. It was from this
action that George appealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
George received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel continued to pursue plea
negotiations and continued to induce George to plead guilty to a sexual crime when George had
repeatedly asserted that he had not acted with any sexual intent.

Counsel knew such

nonadmissions of sexual intent would make it virtually impossible for George to receive
probation and therapy given the practice and policy at the Office of Adult Probation and Parole
to recommend probation only when a defendant readily admits that he or she has a sexual
problem.
Counsel's ineffective assistance in inducing George to continue to proceed with the plea
agreement prejudiced George in that were he aware that he had admit to sexual intent he would

6

not have changed his plea to guilty and would have instead pursued trial. In addition, the
prosecutor breached the plea agreement by acting in bad faith when he agreed to recommend
probation for George at the Sentencing and then in turn recommended prison time to the Office
of Adult Probation and Parole which effectively undermined George's expectation in the plea
agreement for which this Court should remand and allow George to withdraw his guilty plea.
ARGUMENT
I.

Defendant's Trial Counsel Was Ineffective When He Pursued Plea
Negotiations with the Offer of Probation Despite Knowledge That
Defendant Would Not Receive Recommendation for Parole from
Adult Parole and Probation.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims involve a two-part analysis. First, defendant must
show that his counsel rendered deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and that
such performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. State
v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Second, defendant must show that counsel's
ineffective performance prejudiced defendant. IcL Courts allow a broad presumption in favor
of counsel's actions that "might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Huggins. 920 P.2d
1195, 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)).
A.

Reasonable Professional Judgment Militated Against Counsel's
Inducement to Get Defendant to Plead Guilty,

George's counsel provided deficient assistance when he induced George to plead guilty
to attempted sexual abuse of a child. Counsel proceeded with a plea negotiation in which
7

George expected that he would plead guilty to the crime without admitting to any sexual intent.
R. at 119,173-74. In return, George would receive recommendations from the prosecutor that
he serve no prison time. R. at 119-20. However, after submitting to a Psychosexual Evaluation
in which George was adjudged as a poor candidate for sexual therapy, George was extremely
unlikely to receive probation because he could not admit to sexual intent. This is important
because in the criminal law community, it is common knowledge that judges rely heavily on the
Office of Adult Probation and Parole's Presentence Investigation Reports in determining
sentences. Moreover, it is common knowledge among the legal community that if a person is
charged with a sexual offense and refuses to admit that he or she has a sexual problem then the
Office of Adult Probation and Parole will not recommend parole in lieu of prison. R. at 121.
In the Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing, the witnesses testified that it was common
knowledge that without an admission of sexual intent to the Office of Adult Probation and
Parole, sex offense defendants would not receive a recommendation for incarceration. This is
exemplified in Defendant's present counsel's examination of Mr. Chacon.
Q: Speaking specifically about George's interview with Ms.
Shepherd, did you give him instruction that in May - whenever
this statement was signed — and the time that he - I guess it was
May the 6th, and the time that the sentencing was to be held?
A: Yes, I did. I told him to go and interview with Ms. Shepherd,
and told him, you know, that there might be a difficulty with
Kathy, because I had seen her work in other cases that caused me
some concern.
Q: What caused you concern with her work in previous cases?
S

A: Well, it was my understanding in talking to former clients and
other attorneys that she usually required the individual to
immediately walk in and basically say, "I'm a sexual predator," or
"I'm a sexual person, I need some help, I'm willing to get it in
order to get probation."
Q: That's a fairly well-known fact in the legal community?
A: Right, it is. and therefore I knew that that was going to be a
little bit cautionary, because I knew George had this attitude about
whether his role was or was not sexual.
R. at 148.
In addition, Kathy Shepherd of the Office of Adult Probation and Parole when examined,
testified that it was
certainly a philosophy among not only our staff in dealing with
sexual offenders but certainly the general treatment community
that when someone enters a plea of guilty to a crime involving that
type of conduct, if there is not an admission of a related problem,
that certainly treatment is of no benefit.
R. at 164.
Ms. Shepherd's examination continued and she elaborated that if sex crime defendants
did not immediately admit sexual problems to the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that they
would not be recommended for parole and treatment as follows:
Q: That's well-known in the community, to your knowledge?
A: Certainly, yes.
Q: Because that's, in your opinion, the policy and policy of others,
and has been for years, correct?
9

A: Correct
Q: You would expect any attorney who has been practicing in this
state of Utah to realize that, wouldn't you?

A: Its true that we have to have an acknowledgment up front,
because we can't give months and years for them under the
circumstances to make that acknowledgment.
R. at 164, 169.
This was such an ingrained policy at the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that after
Ms. Shepherd's interview with George, she recommended immediate imprisonment based on
George's nonadmission of a sexual problem. R. at 168-69. Despite the fact that the Office of
Adult Probation and Parole's own Presentence Investigation Report on the General Disposition
Matrix indicated that George was not a candidate for prison. See Presentence Investigation
Report at p. 20, attached hereto as Addendum "D".
Finally, Mr. Chacon was also aware that with regards to sexual offenses, Judge Frederick
did not generally have a predisposition to allow defendants parole without admitting sexual
intent. R. at 156. This clearly indicates that Mr. Chacon was fully cognizant of the prevailing
standard in dealing with sexual offenses by the Office of Adult Probation and Parole. R. at 119,
121.
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B.

Defendant's Counsel Rendered Deficient Assistance.

Despite the fact that George presented a poor candidate for therapy as provided in Dr.
Fox's Psychosexual Evaluation, Mr. Chacon pursued plea negotiations with Assistant District
Attorney James M. Cope to secure a sentence of parole and therapy for George. R. at 138.
Again, despite his realization that George would most likely not receive a parole
recommendation from the Office of Adult Probation and Parole if George continued to deny
sexual intent, Mr. Chacon pressed George to carry through with the plea. R. at 136, 154-55.
It is unreasonable for an attorney to plead a defendant to a sex crime without the
admission of sexual problem and not expect that defendant would go to prison. In the instant
case, George continuously and strongly denied any sexual intent on his part. During the plea
negotiations between the District Attorney's Office and trial counsel, both sides were fully aware
of George's absolute insistence that he did not act with any sexual intent and took it into
consideration as part of their negotiation efforts. R. at 134-36; see also James M. Cope letter
attached hereto as Addendum "C". Notwithstanding that, George's attorney pleaded him guilty
under circumstances in which counseling and probation were a virtual impossibility in light of
the legal community standard.
George's counsel did not properly prepare him for the interview with the Office of Adult
Probation and Parole in preparation of their Presentence Investigation Report. Indeed everybody
was on the same page that it was necessary for George to admit a sexual problem entering the
presentence interview with the Office of Adult Probation and Parole, except George.
11

As required by the plea agreement, George entered the interview with Ms. Shepherd of
the Office of Adult Probation and Parole intent on fully cooperating. To cooperate, George
voluntarily signed a waiver releasing to Ms. Shepherd Dr. Fox's psychosexual evaluation
conducted by Dr. Fox (that George had never seen) and George expressed willingness to
undergo counseling if the Office of Adult Probation and Parole or trial court felt that it was
required. See pp. 6, 11 of the Presentence Investigation Report hereto attached as Addendum
"D".
However, Mr. Chacon had not informed George that he was expected to "cooperate" with
the Office of Adult Probation and Parole by admitting immediately that he was a sexual predator.
In other words, George felt that he had pleaded guilty to an improper albeit nonsexual touching
causing emotional or physical pain to a child, as he had continuously maintained throughout the
process.1 Nobody informed him that regardless of the elements to which he felt he pleaded
guilty, it was essential that George admit that he had a sexual problem before he could receive
the possibility of the all important recommendation from the Office of Adult Probation and
Parole for a sentence without prison.

1

In the Rule 23B Hearing, George was examined concerning his understanding to what
he was pleading:
I was told that all I had to plead to was causing some discomfort
and pain, and that in so doing, I would be granted probation. I did
not have to, at any point, admit to any sexual touching of any kind.
R. at 174 (emphasis added).
12

C.

Counsel's Ineffective Assistance to Defendant but for Counsel's
Inducements Defendant Would Not Have Plead Guilty.

Despite the fact that everybody but George was aware that if he did not admit to sexual
intent, then he would not receive a recommendation for probation and therapy from the Office
of Adult Probation and Parole, defense counsel continued to assure George that if he would enter
into the plea agreement that he would receive probation and would not do any prison time. R.
at 174. Apparently, Mr. Chacon had had some success in a previous case in which a client had
plead guilty without admitting sexual intent. R. at 154. However, he conceded that Ms.
Shepherd would not make a recommendation for probation and therapy without George readily
admitting that he had a sexual problem.2 R. at 154-55. In addition, Mr. Chacon was aware that
Judge Frederick "was particularly tough on this type of offense." R. at 156. Regardless of Mr.

2

Mr. Chacon testified at the Rule 23B hearing concerning that the Office of Adult
Probation and Parole's general policy:
I believe that when the interview -- if they [sex crime defendants]
didn't, in the interview, readily admit that they had a sexual
problem, that probation would be -- wouldn't be an option,
because, you know, she would make the determination that if you
didn't admit to a problem, it couldn't be helped. That's the
problem I had, because the report from Dr. Fox said that George's
particular psychological condition was one that counseling itself
would have to direct him to a point where he would admit his
sexuality, and that based on the limited interview with Ms.
Shepherd, I didn't see how this type of an individual would be able
to make that admission to her in such a fashion, you know, to be
able to affirmatively gain a recommendation from AP&P, from
Judge Frederick for probation.
R. at 154-55.
13

Chacon's assertions however, George clearly would not have plead guilty to a crime in which
he would have to admit sexual intent. R. at 144. George was convinced by Mr. Chacon that he
was pleading guilty only to the provision in the statute dealing with a touching that would cause
discomfort or physical pain but was not sexual in any way. R. at 173-74.
Thus, it was clearly unreasonable for Mr. Chacon to plead George him guilty to a sex
offense or sex crime without admission of sexual responsibility in the face of the well known
standard that it is essential that a defendant assert sexual responsibility in order for the Office
of Adult Probation and Parole to recommend probation and therapy to the trial court. It was
almost inevitable that such ineffective assistance of counsel would assuredly result in George
sentenced to prison rather than sentenced to probation with therapy.
II.

The Prosecutor Breached the Plea Agreement by Promising
Defendant That He Would Recommend Probation to the Court and
Then Advising Adult Probation and Parole That Defendant Was Not
a Candidate for Parole.

The prosecutor acted in bad faith in executing his portion of the plea agreement because
he greed to recommend probation at the Sentencing Hearing while informing Adult Probation
and Parole that George should go to prison. "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on
a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York. 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92
S. Crt. 495, 499 (1971). Moreover, prosecutors, in order to comply with the plea agreement,
cannot rely upon "rigidly literal construction of the language" of the agreement, nor may
14

prosecutors accomplish through indirect means what they promised not to do directly. United
States v. Hawlev. 93 F.3d 682, 692 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hand. 913 F.2d 854, 856
(10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Plea agreements are generally governed by contract
principles and are construed according to what the defendant reasonably understood when he
entered his plea. Hawley. 93 F.3d at 692; States v. Mares. 888 P.2d 930, 933 (N.M. 1994)
(holding plea agreement is unique form of contract and court will construe terms according to
what defendant reasonably understood). In Hawley. the defendant entered a plea agreement in
which the government would not oppose certain sentencing adjustments favorable to the
defendant and would file a motion for a downward adjustment for substantial assistance "if
appropriate". Hawley at 684. At the Sentencing Hearing the prosecution made a lengthy
declaration concerning previously unknown facts that appeared in the Presentence Investigation
Report that were unknown to the prosecution at the time they entered into the plea agreement.
Those facts recited in the Presentence Investigation Report were unfavorable to the defendant
and the court determined that by highlighting those negative facts, "[taken] as a whole, the
prosecutor's comments here appear to be a thinly disguised, if disguised at all ever to persuade
court in a way that the government had promised it would not do." Hawley, 93 F.3d at 693.
Similarly, in the present case's plea agreement, the State represented by James M. Cope,
agreed to "recommend probation, without jail time, if George W. Krebs fully cooperates with
counseling and probation personnel during preparation of PSR and while on probation." R. at
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126-33. At the Sentencing Hearing, the prosecutor did state tentatively that "it might be
appropriate in this case, therefore, that George receive probation in spite of the recommendation
of Adult Probation and Parole." R. at 102. Nevertheless, the prosecutor predicated this
statement with the following:
I believe that an appropriate sentence in this regard would make
sure that he does not have contact, especially inappropriate contact,
with children. I believe that an appropriate sentence would put
upon him the burden of getting himself fixed. I'm not certain even
to this point and time that he realizes there's something wrong with
touching the genitals or the anus of a young person, even under the
guise of putting medication on them. One might choose to believe
that if the child were three years old, but not if the child were 10
or 11 or 12, as in this case.
R. at 101.
Such comments seem to indicate the prosecutor's efforts to "persuade the court in a way that the
government had promised it would not do. Hawley. 93 F.3d at 693.
Moreover during the plea negotiations the same prosecutor stated that "since he
[Defendant] has already admitted to the physical acts satisfying the touching element of the
statute, he may be able to gain a probationary sentence even if he denies doing it for sexual
gratification." See James M. Cope letter attached hereto as Addendum "C". It is absolute irony
that Mr. Cope timidly recommended probation "in spite of the Office of Adult Probation and
Parole" at the sentencing hearing when only a few days before the sentencing hearing, Mr. Cope
indicated to the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that "in his view, if the Defendant

16

continues to maintain he has no sexual problems, and did not touch and digitally penetrate the
victim for sexual reasons, then he is not immunable to treatment, and should not be considered
for the privilege of probation." Presentence Investigation Report p. 15 attached hereto as
Addendum "D".
Thus, although the prosecutor did in fact meekly recommend probation for George at the
Sentencing Hearing, he breached the plea agreement and poisoned the process by recommending
to the Office of Adult Probation and Parole that George should not be eligible for probation.
This breached the spirit if not the intent of the agreement contemplated by the parties in the plea
agreement. As a result, this Court should remand to the trial court because the prosecutor had
breached the plea agreement and therefore the plea agreement was no longer enforceable, and
George should be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea. See United States v. Van Thournout. 100
F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996) (allowing two potential remedies for governments breach of plea
agreement: remand for specific performance and withdrawal of the guilty plea).
CONCLUSION
George's counsel provided ineffective assistance when he induced George to plead guilty
to attempted sexual abuse of a child with the knowledge that by so pleading without admission
of sexual intent, that it would be nearly impossible for George to receive sentence without prison
time. Moreover, the prosecutor breached the plea agreement pursued a course of action which
it promised George that it would not do by recommending to the Office of Adult Probation and
Parole that if George did not admit to a sexual intent that he should not be considered a candidate
17

for probation. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision to accept
George's guilty plea and allow George to withdraw his guilty plea.
Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests oral argument.
DATED this / 1 day of June, 1997,
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS, P.C.

,S

,k \

«_

Gregory G. St/ordas
Lloyd R. J<rties
Attorneys forDefendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 'ZO day of June, 1997,1 hand delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to the following:
James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
FINDINGS OF FACT FROM
RULE 23B HEARING

v.
GEORGE W. KREBS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 96190136 FS
Appellate Case No. 960502-CA

Originally charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first-degree felony
with a potential minimum mandatory sentence of 3, 6, or 9 years, defendant eventually
pled guilty to attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third-degree felony. The trial court
accepted the recommendation of Adult Probation & Parole and sentenced defendant to
an indeterminate term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. Defendant
appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel, among other things. During
his appeal, he asked the Utah Court of Appeals to remand his case under rule 23B,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to ferret out additional facts and determine whether

his counsel gave constitutionally deficient advice when he recommended defendant
accept a plea. Specifically, defendant states that his trial counsel did not tell him that in
order to qualify for probation, he would have to admit a wrongful sexual intent.
Because defendant did not admit a wrongful sexual intent, AP&P recommended prison.
The trial court accepted that recommendation. Defendant now alleges that if his trial
counsel had informed him that he could not have received probation absent admitting a
wrongful sexual intent, he would have refused the plea and gone to trial.
Before the appeal, the trial court entertained defendant's motion to withdraw his
plea. Though the trial court did not then look into the alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel, the court denied the motion after reviewing the plea colloquy and affidavit. It
found that defendant made his plea knowingly and voluntarily with a full understanding
of the consequences.
Upon receiving the remand order from the appellate court, this court scheduled
an evidentiary hearing for March 17, 1997. Gregory Skordas represented defendant;
James H. Beadles, assistant attorney general, represented the State. Defendant and
Solomon Chacon, trial counsel for defendant, testified. The defendant also called
Kathy Shepherd, an employee of Adult Probation & Parole, who completed defendant's
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI). The court now issues factual findings.
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1.

Defendant admitted touching the victim at least 50 times on and around

the vagina and anus from the time the victim was six years old until she was twelve.
There was often digital penetration as well.
2.

This touching typically occurred while both the victim and defendant were

underneath a blanket.
3.

Defendant claimed he did this in order to administer medication.

4.

Solomon Chacon was defendant's trial counsel. He is an experienced

criminal defense attorney with approximately 20 years of experience in both criminal
prosecution and defense.
5.

After talking with his client, discovering that he refused to admit a

wrongful sexual intent, and looking at the facts of the crime, Mr. Chacon referred
defendant to a therapist, Dr. Larry Fox, for a psychosexual evaluation and to determine
amenability to treatment.
6.

Because defendant denied a wrongful sexual intent, Mr. Chacon knew that

neither AP&P nor the court would readily consider probation.
7.

Therefore, Mr. Chacon explained all the elements of the crime and

explained to him that he could plead guilty to the crime while admitting to a wrongful
intent regarding the infliction of serious emotional or bodily pain. Thus, he would not
need to admit a wrongful sexual intent and he would still qualify for a plea agreement
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in which the State recommended probation and would not object to post-probation
reduction of sentence to a class A misdemeanor.
8-

Defendant agreed to this plan, understanding that he would also need to

cooperate with AP&P during the PSI interview.
9.

Through his evaluation of all the evidence, and his experience in criminal

practice, Mr. Chacon believed defendant would be convicted of the offense charged,
i.e., a first-degree felony. Mr. Chacon believed the best way to keep defendant out of
prison would be through a plea agreement that would also allow defendant to gain
therapy.
10.

Mr. Chacon worked out a plea agreement with the prosecutor, James

Cope, that reduced the first-degree felony charge to a third-degree felony. The
agreement also included a State recommendation of probation with no jail time, and,
upon motion, reducing the conviction to a class A misdemeanor after probation, with
no objection from the State. The State also agreed not to charge defendant with any
other offenses of which it was aware.
11.

Both Mr. Chacon and the court informed defendant that the

recommendations were not binding on either the court or AP&P.
12.

At the change of plea hearing, the defendant admitted guilt along with the

requisite facts and elements. Defendant did not admit a sexual intent. He also
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acknowledged that the court could send him to prison despite the probation recommendation.
13.

At the interview with Ms. Shepherd, defendant denied any wrongful

sexual intent.
14.

Ms. Shepherd, in accordance with the unwritten policy of the agency, of

which Mr. Chacon was aware, recommended prison due to defendant's refusal to admit
a wrongful intent. Ms. Shepherd testified that AP&P believes that a defendant who
refuses to admit is a poor candidate for treatment and probation.
15.

The trial court did not believe defendant's proffered medication excuse.

Consequently, because of defendant's refusal to admit a wrongful sexual intent, along
with the multiple occurrences and the effect of defendant's crimes on the victim, it
refused to accept the terms of the plea agreement and imposed the statutory prison
sentence.
DATED THIS jfL

day of April 1997.

Stipulation
GREGORY ^SKORDAS
LLOYD R. JONES
Counsel for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL DELIVERY
On 2% April 1997,1 personally delivered a copy of this FINDINGS OF FACT
to the office of:
GREGORY G. SKORDAS
LLOYD R. JONES
Watkiss Dunning & Watkiss
Broadway Centre, Suite 800
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
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6

ADDENDUM B

41

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

76-5-404.1

76-5-404. Forcible sexual abuse.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Fife, 283 Utah A<*v. Kep. 30
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).

76-5-404.1. Sexual abuse of child — Aggravated sexual
abuse of child.
(1) A person commits sexual abuse of a child if, under circumstances not
amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or an
attempt to commit any of these offenses, the actor touches the anus, buttocks,
or genitalia of any child, the breast of a female child younger than 14 years of
age, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child, or causes a child to take
indecent liberties with the actor or another with intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant.
(2) Sexual abuse of a child is punishable as a second degree felony.
(3) A person commits aggravated sexual abuse of a child when in conjunction with the offense described in Subsection (1) any of the following circumstances have been charged and admitted or found true in the action for the
offense:
(a) The offense was committed by the use of a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601, or by force, duress, violence, intimidation,
coercion, menace, or threat of harm, or was committed during the course
of a kidnaping.
(b) The accused caused bodily injury or severe psychological injury to
the victim during or as a result of the offense.
(c) The accused was a stranger to the victim or made friends with the
victim for the purpose of committing the offense.
(d) The accused used, showed, or displayed pornography or caused the
victim to be photographed in a lewd condition during the course of the
offense.
(e) The accused, prior to sentencing for this offense, was previously
convicted of any felony, or of a misdemeanor involving a sexual offense.
(f) The accused committed the same or similar sexual act upon two or
more victims at the same time or during the same course of conduct.
(g) The accused comnutted, in Utah or elsewhere, more than five
separate acts, which if committed in Utah would constitute an offense
described in this chapter, and were committed at the same time, or during
the same course ofeonduxrt, or before or after the instant offense.
(h) The offense was coinmitted by a person who occupied a position of
special trust in relation to the victim; "position of special trust'' means that
position occupied by a pex-son in a position of authority, who, by reason of
that position is able to exercise undue influence over the victim, and
includes, but is not limited to, the position occupied by a youth leader or
recreational leader who i& an adult, adult athletic manager, adult coach,
teacher, counselor, religious leader, doctor, employer, foster parent, babysitter, or adult scout leader, though a natural parent, stepparent, adoptive
parent, or other legal guardian, not including a foster parent, who has
been living in the household, is not a person occupying a position of special
trust under this subsection.

ADDENDUM C

OFFICE OF

DISTRICT ATTORNEY
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
E.NEALGUNNARSON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
VALTER R. ELLETT, CHIEF DEPUTY

April 29,1996
Mr. Solomon Chacon
945 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Re:. State of Utah vs. George W. Krebs
Dear Solomon:
Thank you for speaking with me last week about possible settlement of this matter prior
to trial. You relate that your client is willing to plead guilty to five separate counts of Lewdness
Involving a Child, Class A Misdemeanors. Further, he is willing to waive the Statute of
Limitations to be able to enter such pleas.
I discussed this offer with the victim's parents on Friday, 24 April. They, in turn,
discussed the matter with Melissa. They feel your offer is a good start, but that it does not go far
enough. I agree. Mr. Krebs may plead to a single Third Degree Felony, Attempted Sexual
Abuse of a Child. Since he has already admitted to the physical acts satisfying the touching
element of the statute, he may be able to gain a probationary sentence even if he denies doing it
for sexual gratification. This would certainly seem a prudent thing in view of the new
accusations and Krebsr inability to obtain a positive polygraph score.
Please let me know what you would like to do by Friday. I think that I can convict Mr.
Krebs of a first degree felony, but I don't yet believe that he needs to go to prison, necessarily. I
hope that he takes the State's offer so that both he and the victim do not have to air all this family
business infrontof a jury.

Sincerely,

DPE
JAMES M. COPE
Deputy District Attorney

231 EAST 400 SOUTH

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

(801) 363-7900

V
•^DEFENDANT'S
f f & EXHIBIT

FAX (801) 531-4110
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PRIVATE
STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
REGION m OFFICE
275 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 239-2103

PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
Date Due: 06-11-96
Sentencing Date: 06-l-L-96

JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
S ALT LAKE CITY
(CITY)

THIRD DISTRICT
SALT LAKE
(COUNTY)

KATHERINE C. SHEPHERD

NAiME: KREBS. GEORGE W.
ALIASES: NONE
ADDRESS: 4634 BOX ELDER STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
BIRTH DATE: 12-24-61 AGE: 3*
BIRTHPLACE: UTAH
LEGAL RESIDENCE: UTAH
MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE

COURT
UTAH

INVESTIGATOR

COURT CASE NO: 961900136
OBSCIS NO: 00088629
CO-DEFENDANTS: NONE
OFFENSE: ATTEMPTED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A
CHILD, THIRD DEGREE FELONY. ONE COUNT
PLEA: GUILTY DATE: 05-06-96
PROS- ATTORNEY: JAMES COPE
DEF. ATTORNEY: SOLOMON CHACON
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KREBS, GEORGE W.

PLEA BARGAIN:
The defendant was originally charged with one count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, a
First Degree Felony carrying a mandatory minimum imprisonment term. Through plea
negotiations, he was allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of Attempted Sexual
Abuse of a Child, a Third Degree Felony.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Records of die Salt Lake District Attorney's Office.
OFFENSE
OFFTCTAL VERSION OF OFFENSE:
On 05-22-95 the Munay City Police Department was contacted by Ms. Cindy Krebs, regarding
the possible sexual abuse of her daughter, Melissa Krebs? DOB 12-19-82 (age eleven). Tne
suspect was identified as George Krehs^ Melissa's paternal uncle.
On 05-23-95 Detective Alex HuggarcL and Ms. Shanna Dorius? Division of Family Services,
interviewed Melissa at the Children's Justice Center. Melissa stated she had been couched on her
'"private area" and buttocks by her Uncle George Krebs at her grandmother's home in Murray.
Utah, on numerous occasions.
Melissa stated the earliest incident of abuse she could recall took place when she was five or six
years old, when the suspect began touching her on her "'private area" under her pants. She stated
she initially told her mother who, at the time Melissa disclosed, was on the phone speaking with
her grandmother, and Melissa stated no one beiieved herr thinking she was either confused or
was "kidding." Melissa stated because she was not beiieved the first time she did not report it
again, and the touching became more frequent. Melissa stated almost every time she went to her
grandmother's home and stayed overnight the suspect would touch her on her private area and
her buttocks. She stated she beiieved there were "at least fifty" occurrences of the touching.
Melissa indicated the most recent incident of abuse she could recall happened just after Easter in
April of 1995. She stated on that occasion she was at her grandparent's home, and the suspect
stuck his finger inside of her pants and rubbed her on the front of her vaainai area
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KREBS, GEORGE W.

OFFICIAL VERSION: (continued)
Melissa stated she was unsure if the suspect had ever digitally penetrated her vagina, but reported
he had placed his finger ''inside of my butt" She indicated this was painful, and advised shQ had
cold die suspect that it hurt.
Melissa indicated die abuse would usually occur in her grandmother's bedroom, stating there was
a TV in there and she would go in and iie on die bed to watch TV. She stated her Uncle George
would come in, put a blanket over her, and dien begin to fondle her in the vaginal area and on the
buttocks. She stated sometimes this would occur for as long as five minutes. She aiso stated
when die suspect would get up early to go to work, she would be sleeping in the living room of
the residence and he would come in and touch her on the buttocks and vaginai area underneath
her pajamas, believing she was asleep.
Melissa stated, with the exception of die digital penetration to her buttocks, the suspect had not
penetrated her with his penis, nor had he exposed himself to her. She stated no intercourse had
been attempted.
Detective Huggard asked Melissa why she had decided to teil about the abuse again, and she
stated during a family dinner, the suspect came in and began to put his hands around her hips
toward her vaginal area. She stated she tried to get away from him and he followed her and
succeeded in touching her. Melissa stated she was extremely tired of the abuse and did not want
to be subjected to it any longer, so she told her mother again and this time, her mother contacted
the family's LDS stake president, who referred them to LDS Social Services, and LDS Social
Services instructed them to contact the Division of Family Services and make a report.
Detective Huggard aiso interviewed Melissa's parents, Cindy and John Krebs, and -vis. Krebs
was asked if she remembered Melissa telling her the suspect was touching her when she was five
or six years old. Ms. Krebs stated she did recall this, indicating she now felt extremely guilty,
because at die time, she diought Melissa was confused. She stated she even asked her mother-inlaw (suspect's mother) about it and the mother-in-law told her she was sure such touching was
not occurring. Mr. and Mrs. Krebs stated they were fully supportive of Melissa, and were also
supportive of prosecution, if necessary to resolve the problem.
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OFFICIAL VERSION: (continued)
On 05-25-95 Detective Huggard interviewed the suspect at the Murray City Police Department.
Mr. Krebs was advised of his rights as per Miranda which he stated he understood and waived.
Regarding die allegations of sexual abuse made by Melissa, Mr. Krebs described his brother and
sister-in-law "pushing Melissa off on me,n stating he had taken care of her since she was a baby
and ail of the touching he had engaged in was applying ointment to her bottom ~when sh^ had
diaper rash." Ke indicated this had continued umil Melissa was at least twelve years old. stating
he would open up her vagina and check inside for any type of redness, and on more than one
occasion did insert his finger inside of her vagina up to thefirstjoint in an effort to "check her/7
and also inserted his finger into her anal area in an effort to "apply'medication.*
The suspect stated Melissa would use a blanket to get under when he would be applying the
medication in his mother's bedroom, and stated the touching during the morning hours described
by Melissa was him getting up and coming in to check her after applying the ointment the
previous night, to see if she needed another application of ointment before he went to work:
however, the suspect adamandy denied the touching was for any sexual reason and stated he had
never become sexually aroused. He indicated he had only engaged in the touching for '•medical
reasons."
Detective Huggard confronted the suspect about the unlikelihood ofhim placing medication on a
twelve year old giri, and his touching of Melissa being for "medical reasons.'' rather than being
sexually motivated. The suspect did acknowledge the touching in April of 1995, but again
insisted it was for "medical reasons" and with the knowledge of the family.
Detective Huggard again spoke with Melissa's parents and asked if at any time they had
requested the suspect place medication on Melissa. They denied having ever requested he do so,
nor were they aware of any medical problems.
This case was screened with the Salt Laice District Attorney's OflSce and an Information
charging the defendant with one count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, a First Degree
Felony carrying- a mandatory minimum imprisonment term wasfiled,because of the number of
abuse episodes which transpired and because on occasion, the suspect h*d been in a position of a
caretaker to the victim.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Murray City Police Department records; records of the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office.
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DEFENDANTS VERSTON OF OFFENSE:
;i

I applied Desirine to my niece's sore bottom as directed by both her parents and Grandma (my
mother). I did this because of my mother's medicai problems, which make it hard for her to get
up and get around. Although I didn't do this every time she came over I did do it a number of
times. I didn't do it for any sexuai gradifacation or arousal, but I seem to have caused her some
physical pain. I never meant or intended :o do this. I am sorry this happened and if I couid cum
back the clock I wouldn't touch her at ail."'
Is/

George Krebs

Date: 5-21-96

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Handwritten statement submitted by die defendant.
COMMENTS:
During the presentence interview, the suspect denied any sexuai abuse of the victim, stating the
oniy time he touched Melissa was to put medication on her vaginal and buttock area at the
request of Melissa's parents. When confronted with the tact her parents toid Detective Kuggard
they, at no time, requested he put medication on Melissa, nor were there any medicai problems of
which they were aware, the suspect continued to insist this was the case, indicating he was oniy
trying to assist Melissa.
Mr. Krebs then went on to state he believes this whole situation has been instigated by the
victim's mother, who for some reason does not like his family. He stated he and his mother have
been primarily responsible for the care of Melissa, as well as her siblings, as her mother and
father (his brother) have not provided appropriate care to the children.
The defendant was explained the importance of being honest about his conduct in this situation,
and also confronted with the fact he has entered a plea of guilty to a sexual crime involving a
child (although a reduced charge). The defendant stated he only entered a plea of guilty at the
recommendation of his attorney, advising he did so. "So I won't have to go to prison." Mr.
Krebs was asked if he understands the Coun may still sentence him to prison, or a jail term, and
stated he did understand this, but offered the opinion his attorney had toid him this was unlikely,
if he would enter a plea of guilty and agree to go to counseling.
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KREBS, GEORGE W.

COMMENTS: (continued)
The defendant stated he has been participating in counseling through LDS Social Services, but
acknowledged it is not a sexual offender treatment program. Instead, he stated his counseling
has focused on the stress he and his family have experienced at the false charges which were
filed against him. When asked if he has been participating in the Pre-Trial Services group for
individuals charged with sexual crimes against childrerL the defendant stated he was asked :o go
to that group by his Pre-Trial Services counselor, Teresa, but. *4My attorney talked to diem and
diey told me I didn't have to go anymore."
Mr. Krebs also admitted his attorney referred him for a psycho-sexual evaluation to Dr. Larry
Fox, Center for Family DeveiopmenL Mr. Krebs stated he had not seen a copy of the evaluation,
but indicared he believed his attorney had a copy. This investigator requested he sign a release of
information so the evaluation could be obtained from Dr. Fox, and the defendant agreed.
During further conversation. Mr. Krebs stated he does not feel he has any sexual problems for
which he is in need of treatment and denied he has ever been sexually attracted to the victim, or
any other child. Nevertheless, he stated he would cooperate tiiily with any orders of the Co un if
he were to be considered for che privilege of probation.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Interview with the defendant.
VTCTTM IMPACT STATEMENT:
This investigator spoke with Ms. Cindy Krebs, mother of the victim. She stated Melissa is
currently participating in counseling, but is still experiencing problems as a result of the abuse.
She stated Melissa remains confused and angry over the abuse, and the fact the defendant has
continued to deny the abuse actually occurred, instead blaming her and*her parents for either
fabricating the information, or by staring he was only, trying to provide medical care to Melissa.
She stated Melissa's anger has resulted in her being controlling and angry toward her younger
siblings, indicating this has made the family situation even more difficult Additionally, she
stated Melissa feels very badly about the feet her grandparents do not believe her, and have not
supported her. Ms. Krebs stated the situation with the grandparents has been difficult for ail of
the children, advising her in-laws refuse to visit the residence to see the grandchildren and of
course, the children cannot go to their home because the defendant is there.
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VTCTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: (continued)
Ms. Krebs stated she and her husband have encouraged her in-laws to participate in family
activities with them and the children, but stated her mother-in-law's resnonse has been, "How
can we participate in things with you and leave George out?"
Ms. Krebs stated the defendant has great suppon for his denial of responsibility of this offense or
any accompanying sexual problems, particularly from his mother. She stated his father prefers
not to talk about the situation, and often fails asleep when family arguments occur. Ms. Krebs
indicated this situation, in addition to being difficult for Melissa and the other children, has b^n
extremely difficult for her husband as he has had to choose between 'supporting his daughter, and
having a relationship with his mother and father. Ms. Krebs indicated her husband has made
Melissa his priority, and has sxaied if his parents cannot understand what type of problems are
present in this situation, and encourage the defendant to resolve them, rather than to deny them,
he does not wish to have a relationship with his parents.
Ms. Krebs indicated hers, her husband's and Melissa's only desire throughout this situation has
been to ensure die defendant receive the treatment which he needs, so he does not revictimize
Melissa, the other children in the family, or any other children in the community. She indicated
it was a difficult decision to report this matter to her religious authorities, and subsequently to the
Division of Family Services, knowing her mother-in-law would be very angry and would deny
the crime. Nevertheless, Ms. Krebs stated Melissa's safety, and the safety of other children must
be their priority, and advised shQ is glad they have followed through with the prosecution of this
matter, even though it has caused great difficulties within die family.
Ms. Krebs stated her preference, ail along, has been the defendant acknowledge his problem and
his culpability in this crime and receive appropriate treatment: however, she stated she
understands, without the defendant's acknowledgment there is a problem, treatment will be
ineffective, and he will remain a risk to reoffend. Based on that, Ms. Krebs stated she would
support whatever recommendation the Department of Corrections and the Court felt appropriate,
indicating her primary concern is her daughter's stable mental health and continued progress in
treatment
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Interview with Ms. Cindy Krebs.
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RESTTTUTTON:
At this point inrime,Ms. Krebs stated Melissa is participating in counseiing through LDS Social
Services and shQ and her husband are paying the cost of ±e counseiing. She did not have an
exact amount accrued thus far, but stated she would provide it to this department at a later date.
The defendant should be required to reimburse the victim's family and/or any other agency or
entity for all treatment expenses for Melissa which have accrued thus far. and which will
continue to accrue in the future. Additionally, the defendant shouid also be required to pay
counseling expenses for any other of the victim's family, including her mother, father and
siblings, who need to receive treatment to resolve problems associated with this situation. If
there is any dispute over the amount, a restitution hearing should be 4aQlcL
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
•vis. Cindy Krefas.
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT:
This investigator had been unable to reach Detective Kuggard for his comments, as of the date of
dictation. If information is obtained prior to sentencing, it will be forwarded.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
None.
CUSTODY STATUS:
The defendant was in custody for eight hours prior to his release to Pre-Triai Services .
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:'
Records of the Salt Lake County Jail.
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CRIMINAL RECORD
JUVENILE RECORD:
The defendant was not referred for criminal offenses as a juvenile.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Records of the Utah State Juvenile Court.
ADULT RECORD:
Records of the Utah 3ureau of Criminal Identification indicate this to be the defendant's first
adult arrest of record.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification (no record); Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI No. 805409 AB4); Salt Lake County Sheriffs OfSce (SO No.
JPENDING CASES:
There were no pending cases found for this defendant.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Records of the Third Circuit Court.
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY:
Mr. Krefas has never been under probation or parole supervision.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Records of the Utah State Department of Corrections.
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BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION:
The defendant repons being bom and raised in Murray, Utah He is the second of three boys and
was brought up in an intact family. During the defendant's childhood his father was employed
by the Kennecott Copper Corporation, retiring after twenty-eight years. Tn^ defendant's mother
is a receptionist for the Utah Legal Services.
>/fr. Krehs repons an excellent relationship with all family members, stating, uWe do everything
together." He denies he was ever sexually or physically abused during his childhood and reports
being well provided for, financially. He indicated discipline within the family was "spanking
when we were little, none when I was older. 1 never did anything Wrong/7
The defendant indicated the only trauma within the family has been the current legal situation, as
well as themany medical problems his mother has experienced over the years. He stated it was
primarily due to those medical problems that it was necessary for him to take care of Melissa and
her siblings. Nevertheless, he did acknowledge his mother's medical problems axe not such that
she is unable to maintain full-time employment.
Regarding his relationship with his oldest brother, Melissa's father, the defendant stated "We
have talked a couple of times. He doesn't say much. Ke listens to his wife."
Currently, Mr. Krebs is residing in the home of his parents in Murray, Utah, as is his younger
brother. He stated the only time he has lived outside the family home was when he performed a
mission for the LDS Church to South Korea. He stated this was a verv rewarding experience.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant; character reference letters submitted bv family and friends.
MARITAL HISTORY:
The defendant has never been married, and has no children. He staled he does not date at this
time, and has not since he attended Salt Lake Community College. He indicated his lack of
social interaction with age appropriate females is due to thefeci,"It's difficult to meet kids of my
age in my religion- Most are away at college.7' When confronted with the fact he is now thirtyfour years old and should not be daring "college kids" anyway, the defendant corrected himself,
and stated he feels it is difficult to meet females who have his same moral and religious ideals,
and for this reason, has not dated recently.
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MARITAL HISTORY: (continued)
The defendant reports he has never been sexually involved with an age appropriate adult
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
EDUCATION:
Mr. Krefas graduated from Murray High School and then completed four years at Salt Lake
Community College studying computer inionnarion rechnoiogy. He indicates he is three credits
short of obtaining an .Associates Degree; however, is not currently artending college.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant; copy of educational transcripts.
HEALTH
PHYSICAL HEALTH:
The defendant reports he is in generally good physical health, but does suffer from low grade
asthma for which he is prescribed an inhaler. He reports no other major illnesses nor injuries.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
MENTAL / EMOTIONAL HEALTH:
As of the date of the presentence interview, Mr. Krebs indicated he hM participated in one
counseling session with Mr. Ross Clement, LCSW, LDS Social Services, Sandy Unit. The
defendant was asked why, if he enrolled in LDS Social Services, he did not seek the services of
the sexual offender treatment program which is located in the downtown unit. He staled he did
not, as he believes he does not have sexual problems: however, stated he would change
counselors if so ordered-by. the Court.
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MENTAL / EMOTIONAL HEALTH: (continued)
At the recommendation of his attorney, Mr. Krebs underwent a psycho-sexual evaluation which
was prepared by Dr. Larry Fox, Center for Family Development. The Center for Family
Development is a specialized sexual offender treatment program and Dr. Fox does complete
numerous psycho-sexual evaluations for the Department of Corrections and the Courts; however,
as this evaluation was not completed through the contract process which the Department of
Corrections holds with the Center for Family Development, a release of information was
obtained from Mr. Krebs and the report was forwarded.
In the Summary section of the evaluation, Dr. Fox indicates the defendant does acknowledge
touching the victim on the anus and vaginal area on at leastfiftyoccasions; however, denies this
was sexually motivated or that he received any gratification from it. He reported instead, he was
either applying medication to Melissa, or was "checking to see if she aeeded medication
applied." The defendant denied a need for any treatment relating to sexual problems during the
evaluation.
Dr. Fox found the defendant had an average intellect and as a result, should have the cognitive
capaciry to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct. He also described the defendant as a
:i
tightiy constricted individual/' who demonstrated he will attempt to maintain an image of
propriety, virtue and self control, even under the most adverse circumstances. Dr. Fox felt the
best example of this was the defendant's description of his emotional status as u5ne," when he
was being evaluated regarding a charge of a sexual nature which, if convicted as charged, could
result in mandated imprisonment.
Dr. Fox also found the defendant attempted to present himself as moral and upright regarding his
views on sexuality. He also appeared "so constricted he fails to acknowledge sexual fantasy or
sexual interests." This included the defendant denying he had ever experienced sexual fantasy,
had ever looked at any type of pornography including a Playboy or a Penthouse magazine, had
never masturbated, and had no interest in having sexual intercourse. The defendant also reported*
having not daied within at least the past three years.
Dr. Fox indicated, although none of the test results could be interpreted to specifically imply the
defendant was guilty of a sexual crime (evaluation was completed prior to the plea of guilty
being entered), he indicated, given the defendant's characteristic trait to conform to the moral
expectations of others, it was most unlikely he would be willing to admit to any wrongdoing,
even if he had behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner.
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MENTAL / EMOTIONAL HEALTH: (continued)
Dr. Fox also reported it was "equally unlikely the defendant would be willing to acknowledge he
has a sexual behavior problem or be willing to participate in related therapy."
There is ao piethysmograph evaluation included in Dr. Fox's report, as Mr. Krebs declined to
participate in the arousal assessment portion of the psycho-sexual evaluation.
Mr. Krebs reports he has not participated in mental health treatment or assessment in die past,
other than that related to his current legal circumstances. He reports he has never attempted
suicide.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant; psycho-sexual evaluation completed by Dr. Larry Fox.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
ALCOHOL HISTORY:
Mr. Krebs stated he does not use alcohol at this time, and denied he has done so in the past. Ke
reported no family history of alcoholism.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant; psycho-sexual evaluation completed by Dr. Larry Fox.
DRUG HISTORY:
Past or current use of illegal drugs was denied by Mr. Krebs.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant; psycho-sexual evaluation completed by Dr. Larry Fox,
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EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
The defendant's Social Security Number is: 528-19-6401.
The defendant is currently employed by the Sait Lake Clinic as a lead computer operator, earning
S11.00 per hour. He has been so employed since April of 1988. He works approximately forty
hours per week. Previous employment reported is as follows:
REASON
EMPLOYER
TITLE
WAGE
START/END
FOR LEAVING
Judkins Company

Billing Clerk S4.00/Hr

01-85 /10-86

*ROF

Soft TaLk Inc.

Assembiytine S4.00/Kx

11-82/05-83

ROF

NOTE:
The defendant reported periods of unemployment between 1983 and 1985, and again between
1986 and 1988, me rime which he obtained the employment with Sait Lake Clinic.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant; copies of verification lettersfromdefendant's employer.
FINANCIAL SITUATION:
The defendant reported a monthly income of S2,000.00. He reported total monthly obligations of
approximately S750.00. He reported no debts, and asses in savings of 32,000.00 and SI 1,000.00
in a retirement plan. He also has a 1988 Ford vehicle of an undetermined, value.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Tne defendant.
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MTLITARY RECORD:
Mr. Krebs has never been a member of the United States military.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant
COLLATERAL CONTACTS:
This investigator spoke with Mr. James Cope, the4H£SSSH?nS attorney. Mr. Cope stated on
06-07-96 he received a signed motion filed b^MT. Chacon: and the defendant, requesting the
defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty in this matter. Mr. Cope stated, if the Coun
does ailow the withdrawal of the plea of guilty, he feels confident the victim can successfully
testify during a trial. He stated Melissa and her parents were prepared for the matter to go to trial
with the plea being originally negotiated only days before the trial was scheduled.
Mr. Cope indicated, in his view, if the defendant continues to maintain he has no sexual
problems, and did not touch and digitally penetrate the victim for sexual reasons, then he is not
amenable to treatment, and should not be considered for the privilege of probation. Mr. Cope
indicated the defendant's current attitude regarding this situation indicaies he is ariskto children
in this community.
This investigator attempted to reach Mr. Chacon for his input on this matter, but he was not
available at the time the calls were placed. Two messages were left on his answering machine,
but had not been responded to as of the date of dictation. If information is obtained, it will be
forwarded.
This investigator attempted to reach the defendant's mother, Ms. Evelyn Krebs; however, had
been unsuccessful in doing so as of the date of dictation. The defendant included only his
mother's home telephone number, apparently as she preferred not to be contacted about this
matter at her place of employment If information is obtained prior to sentencing, it will be
forwarded.
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (continued)
Attached for the Court's review are numerous character reference letters submitted on this
defendant's behalffromfriendsand family members. Also attached are two letters of
verification from his employers at the Salt Lake Clinic, as well as letters from his religious
officials including his LDS bishop, and his stake president. This investigator has read each and
every one of these letters. It is noted ail verbalized significant support for the defendant, and a
majority offered the opinion the defendant could not possibly be guilty of this crime, and that it
is a situation which has been fabricated by the victim's mother. They based this opinion on the
fact the defendant is a "wonderiui person.7'

EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:
Now appearing before die Court for sentencing is Mr. George Krebs, a thirty-four year old male.
In this matter he entered a plea of guilty to one count of Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child- a
Third Degree Felony, having been originally charged with one ccunt of Aggravated Sexual
Abuse of a Child, a First Degree Felony carrying a mandatory minimum imprisonment term.
This Is Mr. Krebs's first adult arrest and conviction of record.
In this situation, the defendant sexually abused his niece, Melissa Krebs, over a period of at least
six years, by repeatedly fondling Melissa's vaginal area and buttocks, and by digitally
penetrating her anally and vaginally. The victim originally reported the abuse when she was six
years old, but her mother and grandmother (the defendant's mother) thought she was either
confused or "kidding," and disregarded the disclosure. The abuse was reported again by Melissa
at age twelve after the defendant continually touched her at a family party and tried to get her to
go into the bedroom with him so he could "check her." This time, the victim'smother referred
Melissa for counseling, the matter was reported to the Division of Family Services and
subsequendy to law enforcement
Melissa does seem to be receiving significant support and protection from her mother and father,
but has-been greatly traumatized by the prolonged abuse, and the ensuing chaos within the family
since the disclosure and the report to authorities.
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (continued)
Melissa's grandparents, who are the parents of the defendant, have terminated all contact with
Melissa, her siblings and her parents, preferring instead to support the defendant's denial of
responsibility for the offense. This has been particularly difficult for Melissa's father, as he was
apparently quite close to his parents and siblings; however, he also believes the protection of his
daughter must be a priority and feels if his parents will not support Melissa or protect the other
children in the family, then having no contact is appropriate.
Melissa's mother and father are concerned about the defendant's attitude regarding this situation
and about the support he has received from family and friends for his denial. Cindy Krebs,
Melissa's mother, indicates, at no time, did she or her husband request the defendant put
medicine on Melissa's vaginal area, the excuse the defendant is giving for his sexually abusive
behavior. Tacv believe the defendant is a verv troubled oerson who is in need of long term
therapy, but realized counseling cannot impact the defendant's problems, unless he is willing to
recognize they exist. The victim is participating in counseling, and it appears it would be heipfiii
for her parents to also receive some supportive services.
The defendant was raised in an intact family and reports no abuse as a child. He continues to
reside in his parents' residence, leaving only to complete an LDS Church mission. He is
gainfully employed in a full-time capacity, and this investigator has confirmed his employers are
aware of his involvement in this offense.
The defendant has never married, has no children, and does not date. During the psycho-sexual
evaluation, he reported no outlet for his sexual feelings, and in fact, denied having sexual
feelings, fantasies, or interest in sexual activities. It is likely this very rigid attitude about sexual
matters has been a factor in the defendant's sexually abusive conduct toward his niece, and is
also a factor in his denial of any sexual problems. Additionally, the psycho-sexual evaluation
states, because of the rigidity of the defendant's personality characteristics, and denial of any
problems, he will be uniikeiy to acknowledge the problems in the future, and as a result is a poor
candidate for therapy.
The defendant's assertion he was only trying to assist the victim by putting medicine on her
vaginal and anal area, rather than engaging in abusive conduct, is at best, naive,' particularly if he
believes the criminal justice system would believe this statement The type of abuse which the
defendant-engaged in, and the long term nature of the behavior, indicates he is a highly disturbed
individual who poses a very real risk to children, more so because his denial of any problems,
and because of the support he has from family, friends and religious officials for the denial.
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (continued)
As long as the defendant maintains this altitude he will remain a risk to reonend and he will not
be amenable to treatment As such, it is feit the only appropriate recommendation at this time is
Ions term incarceration.

RE-SPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
i
tATHERJuNE C SHEPHERD, INVESTIGATOR
APPROVED,

^

AX
•••o

TRUDY BARNES, S1ZT5ERVISOR
Attachments:

1)
2)
3)

bentencmg matrix
Psycho-sexual evaluation completed by Dr. Larry Fox
Collateral contact letters

AGENCY RECOMMEiSDATION

In the matter of GEORGE W. KREBS, it is respecrfuily recommended by die staff of Adult
Probation and Parole, the defendant be committed forthwith to die Utah State Prison for die term
prescribed by law for diis offense. It is further recommended he be responsible for all counseling
expenses for die victim, or for any family members who may need treatment to resolve problems
associated with diis case. The defendant should also be assessed a one of S800.00 plus an 35%
surcharge.
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views, V.Supp.R. 1031-33, 1125, 1133, and
further testified that he had never seen nor
heard of a prisoner using a mop handle as a
weapon, id. at 1119-20. We find that Plaintiff, securely locked by himself in a maximum
security cell, was not confined under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm notwithstanding the fact that an inmate
located outside the cell succeeded in inflicting
injury upon him.
The evidence further indicates that Plaintiff likewise perceived himself to be immune
from harm due to his confinement behind the
steel barrier of his maximum security cell.
MacKay's only weapon was a mop handle
which, together with the diameter of the
aperture of the window permitting contact
between Plaintiff and MacKay, suggests that
Plaintiff had many ways to protect himself
from serious harm. He could have placed his
mattress against the broken window as a
shield; retreated into the depths of his cell;
crawled under his bed; crouched beneath the
broken window against the steel door to
avoid exposure to MacKay; or turned his
back to MacKay and covered his head and
neck area. The evidence shows that instead
of protecting himself Plaintiff placed himself
in a position of danger and even continued to
taunt MacKay and poke at MacKay through
the broken window. He neither recognized
nor anticipated the harm that occurred. The
fact that MacKay injured Plaintiff, standing
alone, is not nearly enough to satisfy this
first prong of the Farmer test. Any factual
findings to the contrary are clearly erroneous.
The prison regulations further suggest
that Plaintiffs incarceration in his solitary
maximum security cell did not constitute conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm. The regulations call for the immediate deployment of nonlethal force in three
situations: (1) an inmate injuring another
inmate while both are in a common cell; (2)
an inmate injuring another while both are in
a common area; and (3) an inmate causing
damage to the facility while in a common
area. Aplee.Supp.App. 252 (FG 25/03.01(0).
The fact that these regulations do not apply
to the situation involved in this case, i.e., an
inmate in the common area attempting to

inflict injury on an inmate securely lockeij
a maximum security cell, indicates that sot
a situation was not perceived to be one t b
posed a substantial risk of injury to an* it
mate.
%rr ^
As the magistrate judge correctly notei
various other tactics or responses to the db
turbance caused by Plaintiff and MacKaj
including the deployment of force, may hav
prevented Plaintiffs injury. However, ifc*j
immaterial whether the Officers' pursue
what in retrospect appears to be the mos
effective response if Plaintiff was not incai
cerated under conditions posing a substantia
risk of serious harm. While we are symps
thetic to Plaintiffs grievous injury, the issu
is not whether Defendant Officers woul
have prevented Plaintiffs injury had the;
pursued an alternative course of actioni Be
cause Plaintiffs incarceration did not subjec
him to a substantial risk of serious ham
Defendant Officers' response to the inriden
in which Plaintiff was injured did not violati
the Eighth Amendment.

Appeals, Ebel, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
enhancing defendant's sentence for obstruction of justice after appearance bond forfeiture did not violate double jeopardy; (2) defendant's failure to appear at court hearing,
flight from jurisdiction, and failure to voluntarily return justified refusal to reduce defendant's base offense level for acceptance of
responsibility; and (3) remand to determine
whether plea should be vacated or defendant
resentenced was proper remedy for government's breach of plea agreement
Affirmed in part and remanded.

1. Criminal Law <s=*1139,1158(1)
Sentencing court's factual findings as to
obstruction of justice are reviewed on appeal
using clearly erroneous standard and sentencing court's legal interpretation of sentencing guideline is reviewed de novo.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,18 U.S.OA.
1 Criminal Law <®=»1139

REVERSED.

Legal conclusion concerning double jeopardy reached during sentencing proceeding
is reviewed de novo on appeal. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 5.
3. Double Jeopardy <£=»5.1

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Victor Lyn HAWLEY, DefendantAppellant.
No. 95-3061.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit
Aug. 19, 1996.
Defendant pled guilty to conspiring^
possess and intent to distribute methamphejj
amme and the United States District Courj
for the District of Kansas, Sam A. Crow^jJj
sentenced defendant to 97 months' incarcer^
tion. Defendant appealed. The Court .oj

Fifth Amendment guarantee
double jeopardy protects against
prosecution for same offense and
multiple punishments for same
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5.

against
second
against
offense.

4. Double Jeopardy <3=*25
Forfeiture of bail bond is civil proceeding arising from criminal one in determining
whether forfeiture of bond violates double
jeopardy. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5.
5. Double Jeopardy <3=>23, 25
Civil sanction may be considered punishnient for purposes of double jeopardy when it
subjects offender to sanction that is overwhelmingly disproportionate to damages
caused and when civil penalty bears no rational relation to goal of compensating government for its loss. U.S.C JL Const .Amend.
5.

6. Double Jeopardy ^ 2 5
Not every monetary civil penalty that
exceeds actual financial loss is per se punishment in determining whether civil sanction
violates
double
jeopardy
protection.
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 5.
7. Double Jeopardy <®=»25
Forfeiture of $50,000 appearance bond
when defendant failed to make scheduled
appearance was remedial civil sanction, rather than punishment and, thus, did not pose
double jeopardy bar to subsequent enhancement of defendant's sentence for obstruction
of justice; defendant's failure to appear delayed timely disposition of case and warrant
had to be issued for defendant's arrest in
order to bring him back to jurisdiction.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5; U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
18 U.S.OA.
8. Criminal Law <^1244
Sentencing range for offense is calculated, under Sentencing Guidelines, on basis of
all relevant conduct in which defendant was
engaged, and is not limited to conduct underlying offense of conviction.
U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3,18 U.S.C.A.
9. Double Jeopardy ®=»30
Enhancing drug conspiracy defendant's
base offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice was punishment for underlying
drug conspiracy offense,and did not constitute punishment for defendant's previous
failure to appear in court or violate double
jeopardy when sentence was enhanced after
forfeiture of $50,000 appearance bond.
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 5; U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
18 U.S.OA.
10. Criminal Law <3=»1158(1)
Sentencing court's refusal to grant reduction in offense level for acceptance of
responsibility is reviewed on appeal for clear
error. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,18 U.S.C.A.
11. Criminal Law <S*1252
Defendant's violation of appearance
bond, flight from jurisdiction, and failure to
voluntarily return to jurisdiction precluded
reduction in base offense level for acceptance
of responsibility, even if defendant provided
government with information concerning oth-
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er criminal activity and entered guilty plea
on his return. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 18 U.S.CJL
12. Criminal Law <S=>1139
Whether government conduct violates
plea agreement is question of law which is
reviewed de novo on appeal.
13. Criminal Law <3=U34(3)
Defendant's alleged substantial assistance in investigation and prosecution of others, and prosecutor's failure to move for
downward departure sentence were not subject to judicial review; prosecutor had sole
discretion in deciding whether to file motion
for substantial assistance and there was no
showing that government had unconstitutional motive for refusing to file motion on defendant's behalf. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, 18 U.S.CA
14. Criminal Law <3=>273.1(2)
Government violated its obligation under
plea agreement not to oppose a three-level
reduction of defendant's offense level for acceptance of responsibility and not to advocate
an enhancement of defendant's offense level
for obstruction of justice; government's negative comments at sentencing with regard to
whether case was "extraordinary" had effect
of opposing defendant's receipt of adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility and government's comments did not merely correct inaccurate information but characterized facts
and argued conclusions to persuade sentencing court in a way it had promised it would
not do. U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.1, 3E1.1, 3E1.1,
comment, (n.4), 18 U.S.CA.

three-level reduction for acceptance of<re?S
sponsibility and not to advocate enhancement
for obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G. §§ 3Cmt
3E1.1, 3E1.1, comment (n.4), 18 U . S . C ^

Submitted on the briefs:*
David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender
and Marilyn M. Trubey, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for Defend
dant-Appellant.
Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attor-*
ney and Gregory G. Hough, Assistant United^
States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaint
tiff-Appellee.
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and HENRY*
{Ae
Circuit Judges.
*
EBEL, Circuit Judge.

16. Criminal Law <5=*1181.5(3.1)
Remand for determination of whether
defendant should be permitted to withdraw
guilty plea, or simply be resentenced by another judge, was proper remedy for government's breach of its plea agreement obligation not to oppose defendant's receipt of

On August 4,1994, a grand jury returned*ar*
two-count indictment against Defendant-Ap^
pellant Victor Lyn Hawley and James Lope$
Guardado, charging that on or about the 25gr
day of July, 1994, through the 28th day of
July, 1994, they conspired to possess with*
intent to distribute 100 grams or more' 6C
methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled**
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
and that they possessed with the intent to~
distribute 100 grams or more of metham-#
phetamine, to wit: approximately 440 grams\
of methamphetamine, a Schedule II co&|
trolled substance, in violation of 21 U.S."C^
§ 841(a)(1). On November 3, 1994, Hawley^
entered a plea of guilty to Count I for con-^
spiracy and agreed to cooperate with lawf
enforcement. In exchange, the governments
dropped Count II. Hawley was sentenced'
on February 6, 1995. His sentence included^
a term of incarceration of 97 months. Haw^
ley now appeals, alleging that the govenHment breached its plea agreement "not to*
oppose" certain sentencing adjustments ist-%
vorable to the Defendant and to file a motion^
for downward adjustment for substantial as-^
sistance 'if appropriate."
Hawley also|
claims that enhancing his offense level, byg
two points for obstruction of justice constitufc|5

* After examining the bnefs and appellate record,
this panel has determined unanimously to honor
the parties' request for a decision on the bnefs

without oral argument. See Fed.R-App.P. 34(f/a|
10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered!
submitted without oral argument.

15. Criminal Law <5=»273.1(2)
When plea agreements are made with
full knowledge of facts at hand, those agreements must be adhered to by prosecution in
order to maintain integrity of plea.
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the indictment, Hawley agreed to provide
information about the matters charged in the
indictment in this case and to submit to a
polygraph examination on the information
provided. In exchange for Hawiey's plea,
the government agreed to dismiss Count II
of the indictment; "to not oppose that [Hawleyl receive a three level reduction" for acceptance of responsibility; "to not oppose
BACKGROUND
that [Hawley] not receive a two level enOn July 29, 1994, Hawley and Guardado hancement for obstruction of justice;" and "if
had their first appearances before United
appropriate, prior to sentencing," to file a
States Magistrate Judge Ronald C. Newman
motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for any
relating to the above mentioned charges. At
substantial assistance provided pursuant to
Hawley s detention hearing on August 1,
the agreement.
1994, Judge Newman released Hawley on a
Prior to sentencing, Hawley learned that
$50,000 unsecured bond payable to the United States upon failure to appear as ordered. the government did not intend to file a moIn the appearance bond, Hawley agreed to tion for a downward departure based on
appear at all scheduled appearances in the substantial assistance. He then filed a mocase. Judge Newman also advised Hawley tion to enforce the plea agreement because
that his next appearance date was August 16, he had provided information to law enforce1994, at 9:00 a.m. at the U.S. District Court ment. In addition, he filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing scheduled for
in Topeka, Kansas for arraignment.
January 20, 1995. The district court, in
On August 16, 1994, Hawley failed to apchambers, held a hearing concerning matters
pear at his arraignment On that same day,
that were relevant to Hawiey's ability to
Judge Newman signed an order forfeiting
provide information pursuant to the plea
Hawley*s bond and directing issuance of a
agreement. Hawley argued that he had
bench warrant for Hawiey's arrest. On Aubeen debriefed by the DEA subsequent to
gust 24, 1994, United States District Court
his entering a plea, and that he had provided
Judge Sam Crow signed an order granting
information regarding drug activities in Calithe United States' motion for judgment on
fornia and Arkansas. He further argued
bond forfeiture in the Hawley matter. Hawthat, notwithstanding assurances from cerley was eventually arrested again on Septemtain law enforcement officials in Arkansas
ber 9, 1994, in Arkansas, and he was arraignthat Hawley was still valuable to investigaed on September 30, 1994, before Judge
tions there, his ability to provide information
Newman. After a hearing on the United
regarding drug activities in Arkansas had
States' motion for revocation of Hawiey's
been compromised by law enforcement, and
pretrial release, on October 6, 1994, Judge
he suggested there was reason to suspect
Newman revoked Hawiey's pretrial release
that law enforcement themselves were inand entered an order of detention.
volved in the drug activities. Hawley reOn November 3,1994, Hawley, as part of a quested that the court order an investigation
plea agreement with the United States Attor- to determine whether his "attempted" coopney's office, entered a plea of guilty to Count eration had been undermined by law enforceI of the indictment. At that time, Hawley ment in any way.
stipulated to facts sufficient to prove him
The court denied the motion to enforce the
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the ofplea agreement on the government's reprefense charged in Count I of the indictment.1
sentation that no assistance had been providIn addition to pleading guilty to Count I of

gd double jeopardy because judgment previously was entered against him on the same
conduct when he violated his appearance
bond. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm in part, reverse
in part and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Those facts were summarized as follows: On
July 28, 1994, Hawley and Guardado were detained during a routine traffic stop by a Kansas
State Highway Trooper. The trooper discovered

440 grams of methamphetamine in the car and
Hawley ultimately acknowledged participation in
a conspiracy to distribute that methamphetamine.
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ed to date that would be deemed substantial.
However, the court continued the sentencing
hearing to allow for an investigation into
whether federal agents and/or local law enforcement agents in Arkansas were engaged
in any misconduct which precluded Hawley's
cooperation.
The matter proceeded to sentencing on
February 6, 1995. Hawley again filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing because reports from the earlier investigation
had not been completed. In addition, he
filed a renewed motion to enforce the plea
agreement, incorporating the arguments
from the earlier motion and stating in addition that he was now willing to provide the
government with any information it desired,
including information concerning his brother's drug activities which he had declined to
provide earlier. The government responded
that the investigation by the FBI had preliminarily indicated that the allegations made at
the previous hearing were unsubstantiated.
The government questioned Hawley's good
faith claim of cooperation and stated that the
information he had provided was not substantial and did not merit a downward departure motion. The court denied both of the
motions made on behalf of Hawley.
The court then determined the total offense level applicable to Hawley to be 30. In
calculating this base offense level, the court
determined that a two-point enhancement for
obstruction of justice was merited due to
Hawley's failure to appear at a prior court
hearing. Further, the court concluded that
Hawley was not entitled to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
Hawley argued that the obstruction enhancement was precluded under the Double Jeop^
ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because
judgment in the amount of $50,000 had been
taken against him on his appearance bond
based on conduct also used to apply the
enhancement. Further, Hawley argued that
he was entitled to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because he had cooperated with authorities subsequent to his arrest and had timely entered a plea of guilty.
The government acknowledged its obligations under the plea agreement not to
oppose an adjustment for acceptance of re-

sponsibility and not to argue in favor of an
obstruction of justice enhancement. However, the government went on to note that it
was not aware of certain facts contained in
the presentence report at the time of the
plea agreement, and that the record did not
indicate that this was a "circumstance meriting any extraordinary credit." In light of the
government's position, Hawley requested,
that he be allowed to withdraw his plea due
to the government's violation of the terms of
the plea agreement. The court denied that
request, concluded that the base offense level
was accurately calculated at 30, and sentenced Hawley to the custody of the Bureau
of Prisons for a term of 97 months.
On appeal, Hawley argues that: (1) He
was subjected to double punishment for the
same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when the district court enhanced
his base offense level by two levels for ofch
struction of justice after previously entering
judgment against him on his appearance^
bond for the same conduct; (2) The district
court erred in not granting him a reduction
in his base offense level for acceptance, of
responsibility; (3) The district court erred in;
denying his Motion To Enforce The Plea
Agreement; and (4) The district court erred
in denying his Motion To Withdraw - His
Guilty Plea.
DISCUSSION
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
[1,2] The Sentencing Guidelines provide-;
for a two-point increase in the base offense"^
level u[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed^
or impeded, or attempted to obstruct orinH;|
pede, the administration of justice during
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing" of>/;
the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Ther%
district court assessed this enhancement?^
against Hawley because he failed to appear^
for arraignment as ordered. Hawley conj^
tends this constitutes double punishment,iff^
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause be^jS
cause judgment previously was entered||
against him on his $50,000 appearance bondg
as a result of the same conduct We Tevi&fM
the district court's factual findings as to.thefl
obstruction of justice under the cleiHv prm^H
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neous standard, and review de novo the district court's legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Janus
Industries, 48 F.3d 1548, 1559-60 (10th Cir.),
cert denied. — U.S.
, 116 S.Ct. 87, 133
L.Ed.2d 44 (1995). We also review de novo
the district court's legal conclusion regarding
double jeopardy. United States v. Cardall,
885 F.2d 656, 665 (10th Cir.1989).
[3-5] The Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense and
against multiple punishments for the same
offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076-77, 23 L.Ed.2d
656 (1969). Hawley's double jeopardy argument is based solely upon the latter protection against multiple punishments for the
same offense. We have recognized that the
forfeiture of a bail bond is a civil proceeding
arising from a criminal one. United States v.
BrouilH 736 F.2d 1414, 1415 (10th Cir.
1984). However, the fact that a sanction is
fairly characterized as "civil" does not mean
that it can never constitute punishment for
the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-^48, 109 S.Ct. 1892,
1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), stated that:
[T]he labels ''criminal" and "civil" are not
of paramount importance. It is commonly
understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals,
and, conversely, that both may be served
by criminal penalties
[T]he determination of whether a given civil sanction
constitutes punishment in the relevant
sense requires a particularized assessment
of the penalty imposed and the purposes
that the penalty may fairly be said to
serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a
criminal sanction constitutes punishment
when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment.
The rule announced in Halper is that a civil
sanction may be considered punitive when it
subjects the offender to a "sanction over2. The recent Supreme Court case of United States
v. Ursery,
U.S.
,
, 116 S.Ct. 2135.
2149. 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), is not directly
dispositive because it held that in rem civil forfeitures do not implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Here, there was no in rem forfeiture

whelmingly disproportionate to the damages
he has caused . . . [and when] the civil penalty . . . bears no rational relation to the goal
of compensating the Government for its
l o s s . . . . " Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902; see
also Department of Revenue v. Kurtk Ranch,
511 U.S. 767,
, 114 S.Ct. 1937,
1947-48, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (relying on
Halper to conclude that a state tax on illegally grown marijuana exacted punishment and
not merely revenue).2
The government argues that Hawley's bail
bond was a form of contract between the
government on the one hand and Hawley and
his surety on the other. When Hawley violated the terms of his pretrial release he
breached the contract with the government
and the judgment entered in the government's favor on the appearance bond was the
government's remedy under the contract.
The government argues that this civil sanction served a "remedial purpose," and was
reasonably related to the government's damages. We agree.
[6] The Court in Halper stated that
courts should undertake a "particularized assessment" of the civil penalty imposed and
the purposes that the penalty may fairly be
said to serve when determining whether a
given civil sanction constitutes punishment.
490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02. In
making such an assessment, we note that not
every monetary penalty exceeding actual financial loss is per se punitive. "[T]he government is entitled to rough remedial justice,
that is, it may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as
reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed
sum plus double damages, without being
deemed to have imposed a second punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy
analysis." Id. at 446, 109 S.Ct. at 1900.
[71 In this case, Hawley's failure to appear for a scheduled court proceeding delayed the timely disposition of this case. A
because Hawley's appearance bond was unsecured: rather upon his breach of the terms of the
bond an m personam judgment in the S50.000
face amount of the bond was entered against
him.
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warrant had to be issued for Hawley's arrest "relevant conduct" at his marijuana sentetuif
in order to bring him back to the District of ing. Witte, — U.S. at
, 115 S.Cfi^
Kansas. Based on these facts, we conclude at 2203-04. Thus, defendant argued, the£
that the $50,000 judgment for violating the subsequent prosecution on cocaine charges^
appearance bond was not overly dispropor- violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
tionate to the government's anticipated costs
associated with being forced to delay Haw[9] The Supreme Court rejected this iSk
ley's criminal proceeding and hunt him down. gument, holding that "use of evidence"^
Therefore, that judgment was remedial and related criminal conduct to enhance a deferiS
not punitive, posing no double jeopardy bar dant's sentence for a separate crime within
to the enhancement of Hawley's sentence the authorized statutory limits does not cbn-J
under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Cf. United States v. stitute punishment for that conduct within!
Barger, 458 F.2d 396, 396-97 (9th Cir.1972)
the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause"**
(forfeiting bail compensates for damages and
Id. at
, 115 S.CL at 2206. Fiirtheraore,?'
is deemed civil, not criminal in nature;
"it makes no difference . . . whether the ' e n ^
hence, it does not implicate the Double Jeophancement occurred in the first or second,J
ardy Clause when the defendant is also consentencing proceeding." Id.
victed of the crime of jumping bail); United
The relevant conduct provisions oi the,
States v. Garcia-Trevino, 843 F.Supp. 1134,
Sentencing Guidelines, like their criminal
1134-35 (S.D.Tex.1994) (applying Halper and
history counterparts and the recidivism]
concluding that "the entry of a civil judgment
statutes . . . , are sentencing enhancement
forfeiting a bond for failure to appear at trial
regimes evincing the judgment that a parsolely serves a remedial purpose, not punishticular offense should receive a more sen?
ment of the defendant, and therefore is not a
ous sentence within the authorized range if?
bar to subsequent criminal prosecution for
it was either accompanied by or precededfailure to appear based on the same conby additional criminal activity
WS
duct").
hold that, where the legislature has autho^
[8] Furthermore, in light of the Supreme
rized such a particular punishment ranges
Court's decision in Witte v. United States,
for a given crime, the resulting sentenced
— UJS.
, 115 S.Ct 2199, 132 h.EdM
within that range constitutes punishment
351 (1995), we are compelled to conclude that
only for the offense of conviction for purj
the enhancement for obstruction of justice
poses of the double jeopardy inquiry. a'\Z
was not punishment for any conduct other
, 115 S.Ct. at 2208. We conclude^
than the conduct to which Hawley pleaded Id at
guilty. In Witte, the defendant pleaded that the facts of this case are governed"!by]
guilty to a federal marijuana charge.
— Witte. The enhancement of Hawley's sen^
U.S. at
, 115 S.Ct. at 2203. The presen- tence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was punxsh|
tence report calculated the base offense level ment for the underlying offense to which h£
under the Sentencing Guidelines by aggre- pleaded guilty, not punishment for failing toj
gating the total quantity of drugs involved, appear. See also United States v. Carey't$i3ft
including drugs relating to uncharged crimi- F.2d 44, 46-47 (11th Cir.1991) (citing severalj
nal conduct, in this case, cocaine. Id. Un- other circuits and holding that a two Ievejj
der the Guidelines, the sentencing range for increase for obstruction of justice in^firsj*
an offense is calculated on the basis of all case relating to credit card fraud d o e s W
"relevant conduct" in which the defendant constitute punishment for failure to appef
was engaged and is not limited to the con- and does not bar a later prosecution *jc
duct underlying the offense of conviction. failing to appear), cert denied, 503 U.S. .9
U.S.S.G. § IB 1.3. When the defendant was 112 S.Ct 1676,118 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992). ^' J
subsequently indicted for offenses relating to
his involvement with cocaine, he moved to ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY**
dismiss the charges, arguing that he had
[101 Hawley next argues that the dist
already been punished for the offenses becourt erred in not granting him a reductiojS
cause the cocaine had been considered as
in his base offense level for acceptance?.^
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responsibility. We review for clear error the
district court's refusal to grant a reduction in
offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1223 n.
1 (10th Cir.1995). "We recognize that '[t]he
sentencing judge is in a unique position to
evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination
of the sentencing judge is entitled to great
deference on review.'" United States v.
Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir.1995)
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 5))
(alteration in original).
[11] U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides in relevant part as follows: "(a) If the defendant
clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense
level by 2 levels." Application Note 3 to
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides that entry of a
plea of guilty prior to the commencement of
trial combined with admission of the conduct
of the offense of conviction and any other
additional relevant conduct constitutes significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility.
Application Note 3 goes on to say, however,
that this evidence may be "outweighed by
conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent
with such acceptance of responsibility," and
that the guilty plea does not entitle the defendant to an adjustment as a matter of
right Application Note 4 then advises that
"[clonduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the
Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted
responsibility for his criminal conduct.
There may, however, be extraordinary cases
in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1
and 3E1.1 may apply."
The district court denied the § 3E1.1
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility on the basis of Application Note
4, concluding that there were no exceptional
circumstances warranting a § 3E1.1 adjustment in light of Hawley's conduct of flight
that gave rise to an upward enhancement for
obstructing justice under § 3C1.1. Hawley
argues that, if he loses his double jeopardy
challenge to the upward adjustment for obstructing justice (as he has), this is nevertheless one of those "extraordinary cases" where
an adjustment under both §§ 3C1.1 and

3E1.1 is appropriate. He relies principally
on United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d 378, 383
(9th Cir.1994), where the Ninth Circuit held
that an enhancement for obstruction of justice is not inconsistent with an acceptance of
responsibility adjustment "when a defendant,
although initially attempting to conceal the
crime, eventually accepts responsibility for
the crime and abandons all attempts to obstruct justice." Hawley contends that the
conduct constituting obstruction of justice did
not continue after he was received back into
custody in September, 1994, and that upon
his return to Kansas in late September, 1994,
he immediately entered into negotiations
with the government to provide information
concerning other criminal activity and entered his plea of guilty. Thus, the conduct
forming the basis for the obstruction of justice enhancement ceased and was replaced
by conduct indicating a clear acceptance of
responsibility.
In determining whether a defendant has
"accepted responsibility," we have held that
"the sentencing court can consider if there
has been a Voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations.'" United States v. Amos, 984 F.2d
1067, 1073 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1, Application Note 1(b)). In this
case, assuming arguendo that Hawley accurately characterizes his conduct after being
returned to Kansas, there still remains the
question as to whether his "good conduct"
was in fact voluntary. Hawley fails to appreciate the fact that he had been arrested,
released on an appearance bond, and then
violated his appearance bond. He had to be
returned to Kansas by law enforcement; he
did not return on his own. Conduct amounting to escape or violation of an appearance
bond is certainly evidence of failure to accept
responsibility, and this fact alone provides
adequate foundation for the district court's
decision. See id. at 1072-73 (concluding that
defendant's attempted escape from jail while
awaiting sentencing supported application of
enhancement for obstruction of justice and
provided adequate grounds for denial of
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility). Thus, notwithstanding Hawley's emphasis on Hopper and his conduct
after returning to Kansas, the district court
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did not clearly err in its conclusion that
Hawley failed to "clearly demonstrate[ ] acceptance of responsibility" entitling him to a
reduction in his sentence under § 3E1.1.
See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). 3
MOTION TO ENFORCE
THE
PLEA
AGREEMENT
[12] Hawley asserts that he was entitled
to a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1
(substantial assistance),4 and also that the
government was required to file such motion
pursuant to the plea agreement. He alleges
that the government acted in bad faith in not
filing the motion. Whether government conduct has violated a plea agreement is a question of law which we review de novo. United
States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1442 (10th
Cir.), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 116 S.Ct.
133, 133 L.Ed.2d 81 (1995). "[Pllea bargains
are governed by contract principles, and if
any ambiguities are present, they will be
resolved against the drafter." United States
v. Massey, 997 F.2d 823, 824 (10th Cir.1993)
(citation omitted) (alteration in original).
[13] In exchange for Hawley's plea of
guilty to Count I of the indictment, the government made certain concessions. The concession at issue here is found at paragraph
7(D) of the Plea Agreement. In paragraph
7(D) the government agreed:
If appropriate, prior to sentencing, to file a
motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, to
reduce [Hawley's] sentence to reflect his
substantial assistance, if any, in the inves3. Hawley also claims that he qualifies for the
additional one-point downward adjustment under subsection (b), which authorizes such an
adjustment in the following situation:
(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a)
is level 16 or greater, and the defendant has
assisted authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by taking
one or more of the following steps:
(1) timely providing complete information to
the government concerning his own involvement in the offense; or
(2) timely notifying authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting
the government to avoid preparing for trial
and permitting the court to allocate its
resources efficiently.
Because Hawley's entitlement to an adjustment
under subsection (b) turns on whether he first
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tigation and/or prosecution of another per
son(s) involved in this offense or othei
offenses....
- /$
Paragraph 8, however, states that u[t]he de
fendant acknowledges and understands tha
the decision, whether to file this motion,. ari(
whether he has provided substantial asas
tance, is a matter that resides in the sole anc
exclusive discretion of the United States'Al>
torney for the District of Kansas."
Hawley contends that he did "substantially
assist" the government by: (1) providing; in.
formation concerning the activities whicj
formed the basis of the Indictment, both m
California and Arkansas; (2) providing info$
mation to the court regarding conduct^S
Arkansas which interfered with his ability to
cooperate; and (3) expressing his willingness
to provide information about his brothers
drug activities. Hawley further contends
that the government took no steps to have a
polygraph examination administered to him
concerning the information he provided'ana
that the government conducted a "less than
enthusiastic investigation" into his claims're|
garding interference with his ability to cbpn-j
erate before concluding them to be meritless
The government responds that Hawley ^dS
not substantially assist its investigationsfiap£
that after Hawley was returned to custody^
he "further obstructed justice by making]
false allegations of law enforcement corru]H
tion in Arkansas," which, upon investigation
turned out to be fictitious.5
meets the requirements of subsection (a)i whicH
he has not done, we reject this argument as wellj
4. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 provides in part: "Upori'mo^
tion of the government stating that the defendant?
has provided substantial assistance in the inyestis
gation or prosecution of another person who'hafl
committed an offense, the court may depart # o $ |
1
the guidelines."
'
5. At the sentencing hearing the government^
informed the court that "there is evidencej'
indicates that during the period oi time*'.
[Hawley] was at-large between the time i"""
failed to appear and subsequendy was ai
knowing that the codefendant was providing^
formation, the defendant provided informau'bflj
others, particularly his brother, indicating^
codefendant was providing information;'andL-j
that manner obstructed the assistance of thetajj
defendant."

The district court concluded that "the government has demonstrated it has abided by
the terms of the plea agreement and the
government has reasonably and apparently
in good faith concluded that the information
provided by the defendant is not sufficient to
warrant the filing of a motion pursuant to
§ 5K1.1, and the defendant's failure to—failure and inability to provide information that
would substantially assist the government in
its investigation of criminal activities clearly
justify the government decision not to file a
motion for a reduction of sentence for substantial assistance, and therefore, a motion to
enforce the plea agreement is again denied."
As with other decisions made by prosecutors, "federal district courts have authority to
review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a
remedy if they find that the refusal was
based on an unconstitutional motive." Wade
v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-36, 112
S.Ct. 1840, 1843-44, 118 L.Ed2d 524 (1992)
(staring as an example of an unconstitutional
motive a situation where a prosecutor refuses
to file a substantial-assistance motion because of the defendant's race or religion).
u
It follows that a claim that a defendant
merely provided substantial assistance will
not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even
to discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Nor
would additional but generalized allegations
of improper motive." Id. at 186, 112 S.Ct at
.1844. "[A]bsent an unconstitutional motive
for refusing to do so, the prosecution enjoys
•complete discretion in determining whether
to file a substantial assistance motion, and
'—. a claim seeking to compel a motion based
on a defendant's view of what he or she
deems to have been 'substantial assistance'
*fll not be entertained." Massey, 997 F.2d
at 824 (citing Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-87, 112
S.CL at 1844).
'. We have stated that "Congress wisely or
"Unwisely left the matter of substantial assistance to the prosecutor, unless there's a for' m a l agreement which would bind the prosecutor." Massey, 997 F.2d at 824 (internal
potation marks omitted). Under Hawley's
Plea Agreement the decision whether to file
^ m o t i o n for substantial assistance resides
•within the "sole and exclusive discretion" of

the prosecutor, Hawley does not allege that
the government in this case had an unconstitutional motive for its refusal to file a motion
for substantial assistance on his behalf.
Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider this
claim further. See United States v. Gerber,
24 F.3d 93, 95 (10th Cir,1994) (exercising
jurisdiction to review "alleged constitutional
infirmities arising from the prosecutor's discretionary refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion").
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA
[14] In exchange for Hawley entering a
plea of guilty to Count I of the Indictment,
the government also agreed, inter alia, not
to oppose that Hawley receive a three level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility and
not to oppose that Hawley not receive a two
level enhancement for obstruction of justice.
The presentence report recommended that
Hawley should receive a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice and that, pursuant to Application Note 4 of U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1, Hawley be denied a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. In
the government's written response to the
presentence report, the government made
the following comments:
The government responds in acknowledging its obligation under the plea agreement not to advocate such an enhancement
but agrees with the facts related to the
presentence report.
The government acknowledges its obligation under the plea agreement to not
oppose a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Further, the government agrees with the facts related in
the presentence report and states there is
no evidence that this is "an extraordinary
case" allowing for both an enhancement
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and a reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
At the sentencing hearing the government
made the following additional comments to
the judge:
May it please the court, your honor, regarding the defendant's objections, we
have filed a formal response to the formal
objections. They are considered in the
presentence investigation report.
They
accurately reflect the government's position. Pursuant to plea agreement, our po-
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sition was that, at the time that the agreement was signed, to not oppose that no
enhancement for obstruction occur, and
not oppose that exception—acceptance of
responsibility credit be given; however, we
note for the record the facts contained in
the presentence investigation report that
we were not aware of at the time of the
agreement. We also note the facts regarding the defendant's debriefing that—or
lack thereof that were unknown to us at
the time that we entered into the plea
agreement. We believe that in spite of our
absence of opposition to the defendant's
not getting the obstruction and getting
acceptance that the facts are accurately
recited in the PSIR.
As it relates to this, however, being an
extraordinary circumstance meriting any
extraordinary credit, we believe the record
is completely devoid of that and that the
record would be in the PSIR, and we
believe that the court, upon reflection of
the facts contained therein, should come to
a similar conclusion. There is just nothing
extraordinary about this matter as it relates to the role in the offense, the defendant's role in the offense between him and
Mr. Guardado. He would have been above
Mr. Guardado, and in fact, it appears that
through his relationship with his brother
would have had a substantially superior
role to others involved in this matter as a
purely factual matter, and for that reason,
largely for that reason, he was unwilling to
give up any information whatsoever in a
timely fashion regarding his brother, in a
fashion where anything regarding the allegations in this indictment could have been
reasonably linked to his brother, so for
those reasons, we would ask the court to
consider the plea agreement and to consider the facts contained in the PSIR that
were considered in responding to the defendant's objections in light of those facts
that were unknown to the government at
the time that the plea agreement was entered. Thank you.
Immediately following the government's
commerts during the sentencing hearing,
Hawley made the following motion:
Your Honor, the government, by the comments that it has just made, has com-

U.S. v. HAWLEY
Cite as 93 F.3d 682 (10th Cir. 1996)

pletely violated every term of the plej
agreement that was entered into herein
therefore we move to withdraw the plea
The district court denied the motion.
"[W]hen a plea rests in any significan
degree on a promise or agreement of th<
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be pan
of the inducement or consideration, sue]
promise must be fulfilled." Santobello ,u
Neiv York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct 495
499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Furthermore
"[i]n order to comply with the plea agree:
ment, the government cannot rely upon;!
Vigidly literal construction of the language
of the agreement, nor may it accomplisl
'through indirect means what it promised noi
to do directly.'" United States v. Hand, 912
F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Unitel
States v. ShorteetK 887 F.2d 253, 256 (lOtl
Cir.1989)). We review de novo whether gov
ernment conduct has violated a plea agree
ment. Allen u. Hodden, 57 F.3d 1529, 15$
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, — U.S.
, 111
S.Ct. 544,133 L.Ed.2d 447 (1995).
Plea agreements are governed by contracl
principles, Massey, 997 F.2d at 824, and.we
must construe the Plea Agreement according
to what Hawley "reasonably understood)
when he entered his plea, Shorteeth, 887 R2c
at 256. After review of the Plea Agreemenl
in this case, and the governments statement
to the court during sentencing, we conclude
that the Agreement can reasonably be ihtiea
preted as proscribing the comments made-l>3
the government at the sentencing hearing
Furthermore, we conclude that the conl
ments accomplished by indirect means whaj
the government promised not to do directijj
The government argues that it was only fal
filling its obligation to apprise the courteaj
"information which protects the sentencinj
decision from the taint of incomplete; anc
inaccurate information." The governmeH
further contends that provision of such infjWj
mation does not violate a plea agreemeg
where the prosecutor does not a t t e m p t ^
characterize or argue its effect to the sea
tenting judge.
However, here the government was*iEJ
responding to "inaccurate information."*^^
Hand, 913 F.2d at 856 (indicating thatitifi
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prosecutor has a responsibility to inform the
court so that its decision will not be "tainted
by incomplete and inaccurate information").
To the contrary, the government merely un(jerscored the facts recited in the PSIR and
argued that such facts did not show that
Hawley had presented an extraordinary situation that would entitle him to a reduction in
his sentence given the finding that he had
obstructed justice. Taken as a whole, the
prosecutor's comments here appear to be a
thinly disguised, if disguised at all, effort to
persuade the court in a way that the government had promised it would not do. In
Hand, the government agreed in a plea
agreement to recommend a two-level reduction for the defendant's role as a minor participant in the offense. 913 F.2d at 855. At
the defendant's sentencing hearing, the defendant personally testified concerning his
role in the offense and called witness to
support his position. Id. The government
cross-examined these witnesses, and in doing
so elicited certain factual clarifications which
tended to undermine the defendant's position
that he played a minor role in the offense.
Id. The government ultimately did recommend that the defendant receive a reduction
for having a minor role in the offense, stating
to the court that "the court's well aware of
the facts in this case and can make its own
conclusion." Id. at S56. The defendant argued that the government violated the plea
agreement by eliciting unfavorable facts on
cross examination during the sentencing
hearing and by the prosecutor's comments
that the court was free to reach its own
conclusion based on the facts before it. Id.
We rejected defendant's claim, holding that
la] promise to 'recommend a reduction' is
not a promise to stand mute in the face of
incorrect or misleading testimony offered before the trial court." Id. We did, however,
a&ggest that if the prosecutor had attempted
to "characterize the evidence elicited on cross
examination," or to "argue the effect of such
evidence to the sentencing judge," the result
anght have been different. Id. & n. 3.

only have the effect of opposing Hawley's
receipt of an adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility. As discussed earlier, the
only way Hawley could have received a reduction for acceptance of responsibility after
having received an enhancement for obstruction of justice would have been if he qualified as an "extraordinary" case. U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1, Application Note 4. Furthermore,
the government was not correcting inaccurate information when it asserted that the
record is u devoid" of facts indicating that
this is an extraordinary case, and stating
that i4we believe that the court, upon reflection of the facts contained therein, should
come to a similar conclusion." These statements do more than merely state facts or
simply validate those facts found in the Presentence Report; they provide a legal "characterization" of those facts and "argue the
effect" of those facts to the sentencing
judge.

Here, the government's comments do
characterize the facts and do argue a conclu^ a to the sentencing judge. The government's negative comments with regard to
Aether this case was "extraordinary" could

Id.
The government breached its
agreement with Hawley, and Hawley is
tled to relief regardless of whether the
ernment's conduct actually affected the
tencing judge. Santobello, 404 U.S. at

[15] Finally, the fact that the government
may not have been aware of certain facts in
the Presentence Report at the time it entered into the Agreement with Hawley does
not excuse or justify its conduct at the sentencing hearing. When plea agreements are
made with "full knowledge of the facts at
hand," those agreements must be adhered to
by the prosecution in order to maintain the
integrity of the plea. United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir.1995) (emphasis added).
If at a later date the government discovers
facts that cause it to believe that its prosecutorial discretion was not properly exercised, it has the ethical obligation to withdraw from the plea agreement and advise
the defendant so that he or she may prepare for trial or renegotiate. It is certainly not proper for the government to wait
until the sentencing hearing then breach
the terms of the plea agreement, shielding
its behavior by claiming its obligation to be
an ethical officer of the court.
plea
entigovsen262-
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63, 92 S.Ct. at 498-99 (holding that whether
or not the prosecutor's conduct actually influenced the judge's decision or not, "the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of
the duties of the prosecution in relation to
promises made in the negotiation of pleas of
guilty will be best served by remanding the
case to the state courts for further consideration").
[16] The Court in Sa?itobello remanded
the case back to the state courts to determine the defendant's ultimate relief because
the state court was "in a better position to
decide whether the circumstances of [the]
case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in
which case [defendant] should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in
the view of the state court, the circumstances
require granting the relief sought by [defendant], i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his
plea of guilty." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263,
92 S.Ct. at 499 (footnote omitted). Providing
this type of latitude for the district court on
remand is preferable in light of the district
court's position with respect to the case. See
Allen, 57 F.3d at 1534 (citing Santobello and
stating that "[i]f the court finds that the
government breached the plea agreement,
the court must remand the case either for
specific performance or withdrawal of the
defendant's guilty plea"). Compare Cooper,
70 F.3d at 567 (when it is clear from the
appellate record that the government's
breach of the plea agreement is intentional
or egregious, the appellate court may conclude that resentencing is not an adequate
remedy and it may order that defendant be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea). Here,
we believe it is appropriate to remand this
matter to the district court for its determination of whether the defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea or whether
he should simply be resentenced by another
judge under conditions where the government fulfills the promises it made in the Plea
Agreement to not oppose that Hawley receive a three level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility and to not oppose that Hawley not receive a two level enhancement for
obstruction of justice.

Cite as 93 F.3d 6

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, we AFw
FIRM the district court's rulings in this'case
in all respects, with the exception of it$
denial of Hawle/s Motion to Withdraw:
Guilty Plea. We REMAND with mstruc*
tions that the district court determine v L - ^
er Hawle/s plea should be vacated, allowing;
him to replead, or whether Hawley should be;
IV>
resentenced by a different judge.
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prior acquittal, against second prosecution
for same offense after prior conviction, and
against multiple punishments for same offense. U.S.C A Const.Amend. 5.
2. Double Jeopardy <3=25
Civil in rem forfeiture of items that were
used in, or were proceeds of, defendant's
drug activities was not "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, and thus, did not
preclude subsequent prosecution for interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprise.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5; 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 981, 1952(a)(1); Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
§ 511, 21 U.S.C.A. § 881.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Johnny Joe LOPEZ, DefendantAppellant
No. 95-1193.
United States Court of Appeals,'
Tenth Circuit
Aug. 19, 1996.
After settlement of civil in rem forfej
ture proceeding against items that were$aj|
legedly used in, or were proceeds of, defen
dant's drug activities, defendant movectfti
dismiss indictment charging him witfeiri
state travel in aid of racketeering enterpri
on ground that prosecution pursuant tottl
indictment would violate double jeop
The United States District Court forr t
District of Colorado, Richard P. Matsch$ffl
denied motion. Defendant appealed;^9
Court of Appeals, McWilliams, Senior (
Judge, held that civil in rem forfeiture J <
was not "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes.
Affirmed.
1. Double Jeopardy <3=>1
Double jeopardy clause protects «j
second prosecution for same offense^
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-OPEZ

695

(10th Cir. 1996)

juana, approximately $100,000 in United
States currency, and a warranty deed conveying title to a residence located at 10736
Livingston Drive, Northglenn, Colorado, to
Lopez.
The United States then filed a civil in rem
forfeiture action pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881
and 18 U.S.C. § 981. The complaint sought
forfeiture of the currency found in Lopez'
apartment, his interest in the property located at 10736 Livingston Drive in Northglenn,
his automobile, and some additional items of
personal property. The government alleged
that the items sought to be forfeited were
used in, or were proceeds of, Lopez* drug
activities. A settlement was reached in this
proceeding whereby Lopez agreed to forfeit
the currency found in his apartment, a car,
jewelry, the residence on Livingston Drive,
and various items of personal property. A
final order and judgment of forfeiture was
entered on September 23, 1993.
On September 22, 1994, the United States
filed a two-count indictment against Lopez,
charging him with the unlawful possession of
cocaine and marijuana with an intent to distribute each, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The indictment was based on the eight kilograms of
cocaine and the twenty kilograms of marijuana found in Lopez' apartment on January 13,
1993.

. On September 29, 1992, a federal parole
iolation arrest warrant was issued for Johniy Joe Lopez, the appellant It was executed on January 13, 1993, at Lopez' apartment
n
Westminster, Colorado. An ensuing
fcarch of his apartment revealed eight kilograms of cocaine, twenty kilograms of mari-

The parties thereafter entered into a plea
bargain whereby Lopez agreed to plead
guilty to a one-count information charging
him with interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Lopez further agreed to provide testimony before the
grand jury regarding the source of the
drugs. The government, in turn, agreed to
dismiss the original indictment. 1 On November 29, 1994, Lopez pleaded guilty to the onecount information.

• "* «er brief counsel for Lopez requested oral
- argument. The government in its answer brief
, waived oral argument. The case was later set
; for oral argument on May 15, 1996. On April
% «". 1996, counsel for Lopez filed a motion to
• .submit the case on the briefs. This motion was
^granted on April 24, 1996. and on May 16. 1996.

the case was submitted to this panel without oral
argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R.
34.1.9.
1. The plea bargain contained a stipulation that
during January, 1993, Lopez traveled from Colorado to Texas to make payment for the delivery
of eight kilograms of cocaine to Colorado.

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
This case involves the jeopardy clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

